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# EXPERIENCE REPORT ON MODEL-BASED TESTING OF SECURITY COMPONENTS

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
## EXPERIENCE REPORT ON MODEL-BASED TESTING OF SECURITY COMPONENTS

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# Outline

- Introduction
- Our MBT approach
- Experimental results
- Conclusion and perspectives


# Security Components



Security Components have two categories of test requirements:

- Functional Requirements
- Security Functional Requirements

# Model-Based Testing




# Motivation

- Limitations of automated testing based on structural (for ex. requirement) coverage
  - test cases with **limited size** (steps)
  - difficulty to take into account the **dynamics** of the security functional requirements (must be hard-coded into the model)
  - possible issues with the test target's reachability
- Our proposal: use **temporal properties in TOCL** and **Test Purposes**
  - How to **express** the test requirements easily?
  - How to **characterize** relevant tests?

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# Our MBT Approach



\*SoftHSM Virtual Cryptographic Token created by the group OPENDNSSEC



# TOCL and TP test selection criteria

- **TOCL** and **TP** make possible to generate tests that exercise **corner cases**, relevant when testing security components
- **TOCL** allows to express **temporal properties**, for instance of succession or precedence, contributing to the MBT process with:
  - Evaluation of the existing tests coverage
  - Verification of the model's conformance to these properties
    - Simplifying the model debugging
- **TP** allow to express **procedures of tests** based on a verbose representation and using the experts experience and knowledge

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# PKCS#11 and SoftHSM

- **PKCS#11** is an RSA standard that defines an interface called **Cryptoki** to promote interoperability and security of cryptographic tokens.
- Scope: **24 functions** most commonly present in the tokens, such as **session, token, key and user management functions**, as well as cryptographic functions **for signing messages and verifying signatures**.
- To ensure the repeatability of the MBT process we chose **SoftHSM** - virtual cryptographic store largely used for exploring PKCS#11 without the necessity to possess an HSM (created by the group OPENDNSSEC).

# Experimental results

Case study: PKCS#11

Component Under Test: SoftHSM

1<sup>st</sup> experiment: evaluation of **complementarity of test selection criteria** to cover test requirements

2<sup>nd</sup> experiment: evaluation of the **error detection capabilities** (robustness)

# Experimental results

## PKCS#11 set up metrics

Test Requirement category	#FR	#SFR
general purpose	7	4
slot and token management	22	5
session management	32	9
object management	6	1
digesting	28	9
signing	32	10
verifying signatures	31	10
<b>total</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>48</b>

PKCS#11 model element	
#classes	9
#enumerations	20
#enum. literals	123
#associations	17
#class attributes	34
#operations	24
#observations	1
#behaviors	206
#tocl properties	50
#test purposes	5
#LOC	1308

LOC: Lines of OCL constraints

# Experimental results

## PKCS#11 results metrics

Test Selection Criterion	#Test targets	#Test cases	Cov. in %	
			FR	SFR
Structural	206	184	100	40
TOCL	311	90	31	58
Test Purpose	24	24	9	2
Manual	24	24	45	/

**Cost of applying the approach  
~ 20 person / days**




Fig. Distinct fault detection capabilities per coverage requirement

# Experimental results

## Conclusions of the study:

- **Relevance** of the TOCL and TP coverage criteria
  - “Produce tests that one may not easily think of”
  - **augment test requirements coverage**
- TOCL and TP **increase fault detection** capabilities
- **Usefulness** of coverage reports
  - show which part of the requirements are not covered by the tests
- **Cost-benefices:**
  - cost of applying TOCL and TP coverage criteria is very low
  - cost for **regression testing** (for ex. At the end of a sprint) is negligible
- Use of the TOCL properties: **model validation**
  - Use of the TOCL coverage measure to detect violations of the properties by the model

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# Conclusion

- We have experienced an MBT approach :
  - Combining static and dynamic test selection criteria
  - On a real-life security components
- Useful for:
  - Evaluating a test suite w.r.t. security requirement
  - Test selection, to augment a functional test suite
  - Increasing distinct fault-detection

# Perspectives

- Test generation process
  - Online (fuzz) testing
  - Robustness criteria (based on TOCL automata coverage)
- **Looking forward for other pilot projects to foreground our results.**



Thanks for your attention!

**Questions?**