



# Compositional Risk Assessment Combined with Automated Security Testing

The RACOMAT Method and Tool

Johannes Viehmann 2014


# Overview

## RACOMAT

Risk Assessment **COM** bined with **A**utomated **T**esting

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# Introduction

## Importance of Risk Management for ICT-Systems

### Basic observations

- Heterogeneous cross linked ICT-Systems of growing complexity are a key factor in modern industries and societies
- Security is crucial in various market sectors, including IT, health, aviation and aerospace.

### Why Risk Management is required

- In the real world, perfect security often cannot be achieved
  - There are residual risks for any complex ICT-System
- Risk assessment und risk treatment can help to create trust by:
  - Communicating residual risks
  - Help to implement safeguards and treatments for to high risks in order to reduce the risks



# Problems and Challenges

## Risk Assessment and Security Testing

Risk assessment might be difficult and expensive

- Hard for large scale systems
- Is highly dependent on the skills and estimates of analysts

→ Make risk analysis more objective with testing

Security testing might be difficult and expensive, too

- Testing for unwanted behavior – there is no specification what to expect
- Even highly insecure system can produce lots of correct test verdicts if the “wrong” test cases have been created and executed
- Manual testing is error prone and infeasible for large scale systems

→ Automate risk assessment and security testing



# State of the Art

## Risk Assessment, RBST, TBSR


### Methods for Risk Assessment

- FMEA/FMECA, FTA, ETA, CORAS ...
- Compositional Risk Analysis
- Standard: ISO 31000

### Combination of risk assessment und security testing


- Test-Based Risk Assessment (TBRA)
  - Improve risk assessment with results of security tests
- Risk-Based Security Testing (RBST)
  - Optimize security testing with results of risk assessment
- Combination of TBRA and RBST
  - No specific method established

→ The **RACOMAT Method** should close the gap



# The RACOMAT Method

## Iterative Process



# The RACOMAT Method

## Levels of Interaction Between Risk Assessment and Security Testing

### 1. Identification

What should be tested?

### 2. Prioritization

Spend how much effort for which tests?

### 3. Generation

Which test cases should be created?

### 4. Execution

How to stimulate and observe? Where to stimulate and observe?

### 5. Feedback

What do the test results mean for the overall risk picture?

# The RACOMAT Method

## Reusability and Automatization

- Component based, low level risk assessment
  - Reusable risk assessment artifacts
  - Compositional risk analysis
  - Connection with system components
- Security testing is a part of the RACOMAT Risk analysis
  - RBST, TBRA and automatization with the help of **Security Test Pattern**

Security test pattern contain:

- Strategies, models und code snippets for test case generation and test execution
- Generic links between test pattern, risk analysis artifacts and system components
- Information about testability and test effort
- Metrics for test result aggregation and feedback to the risk picture





# The RACOMAT Method

## Security Test Pattern

Field	Description	Format
ID	Unique identifier	Number
Name	Meaningful identifier	Text
Description	Information for the user	Informal XHTML
Relations	E.g. to risk artefacts	{Catalog}, ID, semantics

# The RACOMAT Method

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# The RACOMAT Method


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Metrics	Calculate the risk	Type, (code, informal XHTML)
Evaluations	Assess generator, executer and metric combinations	Enumerations for effort and effectiveness
Feedback	User experiences	Rating, informal comments

# The RACOMAT Tool

## Features and Workflow 1/2

- System analysis and risk assessment
  - Automatically creates interface models for programs, APIs, components, Web-Pages or Web-Services
  - Generates semi automatically initial fault trees or CORAS risk graphs
    - Uses risk catalogues (Mitre CWE / CAPEC, BSI IT-Grundschutz ...)
  - Edit and compose per Drag and Drop
  - Calculates likelihoods for dependent incidents automatically
- Security Test Pattern instantiation
  - Suggests associations with identified threat scenarios and system components
  - Calculates, how much test effort should be spend



# The RACOMAT Tool

## Features and Workflow 2/2

- Execution of tests
  - Once a test pattern is instantiated, generating, executing and evaluating tests works at least semi automatically
    - Often no manual work is required at all, e. g. for overflows or (SQL-) Injections
- Updates the risk picture based upon the test results semi automatically
  - Makes suggestions using the metrics of the security test pattern
    - More precise likelihood values
    - Allows to add unexpected observations as new faults or unwanted incidents by dragging them to the risk graph

The screenshot displays the RACOMAT tool interface, titled "RACOMAT - Risk Analysis Combined with Automated Testing". The main window shows a risk graph with several components and their relationships. The components are:

- SALloByteArray**: Input: In32\_tSize, Output: Byte[]
- SHelloWorld**: Input: In32\_tNumber, Output: String
- SHelloWorld\_Exception**: Input: In32\_tNumber, Output: String. This component is highlighted with a red border and contains a red warning icon. It has a sub-component "Integer Overflow in Wraparound" with a red warning icon and a "CWE" label. It also has a "Test Critical and Rugged Integer" sub-component with a red warning icon and a "CAPEC" label. The output is "Unhandled integer overflow" with a red warning icon and a "CWE" label. There is also a "Just another exception" sub-component with a red warning icon.
- PrintNextNumberToString**: Input: In32\_tNumber, Output: String

The "Test results" window is open, showing a table of incident data:

Incident name	Number of tests	Number of incidents triggered	Percent triggered
Unhandled integer overflow	2004	0	0,00 %


Below the table, there is a text field with the value "Unexpected incident name: Just another exception!" and two buttons: "Calc likelihood" (with a green checkmark icon) and "Close dialog" (with a red X icon).

# The RACOMAT Tool

## Security Test Pattern Library STPL

Security Test Pattern Library STPL is a catalogue of security test pattern for the most common threat scenarios

- If there is no fitting test patterns, new test pattern can be created and edited using the RACOMAT Tool
- User can contribute feedback and they can suggest extensions for the open STPL
  - Quality management with ratings / comments of the users



# The RACOMAT Tool – Demo

RACOMAT Early Demo

# Case Studies

## First experiences from praxis

- RACOMAT method and tool are tested in two case-studies for modular large scale systems
  - S-Network (Fraunhofer, H-C3 TU Berlin, <http://surn.net>)
  - Command Central (Software AG, EU-FP7 funded project RASEN, <http://www.rasenproject.eu>)

### Positive experiences

- The assistants and the libraries of predefined artifacts help to avoid that the analysts miss important aspects
  - Negative risk assessment: remove not relevant threats instead of looking for the relevant threats
- Reusing artifacts helps to reduce the need to reinvent the wheel each and every time – hence, it reduces the potential for analysts and testers to make errors


### Problems

- There are currently only a few useable security test pattern
  - It is difficult to make sound estimates for the test quality, test effort and especially for generic test evaluation



# Conclusion and Future Work

- RACOMAT method and tool already combine risk assessment with security tests tightly
  - Other analysis methods: Simulation, monitoring, verification, review ...



- Basic threat simulation (Monte Carlo simulation) already implemented into RACOMAT
- Assistance for analysis of external cloud services (outsourcing)
- Vision: Open Risk Assessment – Community Driven Risk Analysis

# Questions, Remarks?

Thanks a lot for the attention!

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